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STATEMENT OF FACTS

The statement of facts in the State's brief contains the
following inaccuracies:
At

page

3,

the

State

incorrectly

asserts

that

the

robber's vehicle had its headlights "trained" on the victims.

The

pages it cites stand for nothing more than that the vehicle was
facing in their general direction, and that its headlights were on.
There is no evidence of where exactly the headlight beams were
shining, and no evidence that they were "trained" on the victims.
At

page

5,

the

State

asserts

that

Brandi

Bergsma

described the perpetrator identified at trial as Mr. Lopez as being
5'1" to 5'5" tall.

Her testimony was as follows:

Q
What did you put in terms of height?
A
I think five-one, because I'm five-one, so I
was guessing short. And at the time I just hurried and
jotted everything down. Five-five.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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R. 246-27.

In context, Ms. Bergsma seems to be indicating that she

compared the perpetrator's height to her own height of 5 # 1" # and
estimated him to be 5'5" .
brief

as

addendum

C) ,

See also Ex. 31 (attached to opening
which

unambiguously

references

asserts

Officer

the

perpetrator's height as 5'5".
At
handcuffed
supported

page

three
by

the

7,

the

men,

State

citing

record,

R.

that

246:83-4.

this purported

fact

While

Johnson

ostensibly

cannot

be true.

Richard Bergsma testified that not all the participants in the
show-up were handcuffed, but Messrs. Gomez and Lopez were.
230:187.

R.

Officer Johnson himself later testifies that only Gomez

and Lopez were handcuffed.

R. 101-2.

(photographs of the show-up).
that perhaps

See also Ex. 24 and 26

While the State tries to suggest

these photographs were

taken after the

show up,

State's brief at 5 n.5, implying that the others may have been
uncuffed in the interim, this speculative assertion defies reason.
The State fails to explain why it would continue to detain the
i

other individuals after they had been excluded as perpetrators.
Such

a

suspicionless

detention

would,

of

course,

be

unconstitutional.
At page 8, the State asserts that Mr. Lopez had a black
t-shirt on over a white t-shirt at the time of the showup.

There

is no mention in the record of a black t^shirt, only of a black
shirt.
At

page

8, the

State

asserts

that

"Officer

Johnson

observed that defendant and Gomez were both short and stocky, and
i
2
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were approximately 5'5" tall, and 150-160 pounds (R. 246:90)."

To

the contrary, while he did opine that both were short and stocky,
R. 246:91, his retrospective recollection was that Mr. Gomez was
5' 5", while Mr. Lopez was 5'5" or 5'6".
retrospective guess

Id.

He ventured a

that Mr. Lopez weighed 150-160 pounds.

Id.

At page 9, the State asserts that Mr. Lopez admitted
being at the scene of the crime.

This is a mischaracterization.

Mr. Lopez never admitted to being at the scene, and certainly not
at the time of the crime.
at

the

Circle

unremarkable.

K

Mr. Lopez only admitted to buying beer

located

near

the

crime

scene.

This

is

The State fails to explain why Mr. Lopez should have

driven from the party to a more remote retail outlet, rather than
using the most readily available one.

Given that the apartments

where Mr. Lopez was attending the party were less than two blocks
from this Circle K, R. 246:82, --78, it is completely logical that
Mr.

Lopez

would

shop

there

rather

than

a more

remote,

less

convenient retail outlet.
At pages 10-11, the State asserts that Justin Ketterer
testified that Mr. Lopez returned to the party at 11:45 p.m., when
in fact he testified that he returned at "about 11:30, 11:45."

R.

246:167.
At page 11, the State cites R. 247:16 for the proposition
that Mr. Lopez is left handed.

The cited statement is from the

prosecutor's closing argument, and cannot constitute a testimonial
fact.

Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 354 P.2d 575, 578

(Utah 1960) (statements of counsel are not evidence).
3
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At page 20, the State asserts that "the record is devoid
of

indication

that

the

witnesses

motivation bias or prejudice . . . "

acted

under

any

personal

To the contrary, Rick Bergsma

described the race of the perpetrator as "spick", and described
unusual smells, mannerisms, speech, etc. as "spicks."

Ex. 5.

The

State's purported justification of "cramped space on the form,"
State's br. at 20-21, is not born out by the form itself.

Mr.

Bergsma had plenty of room to write hispanic, as he did in Block #3
on the front of the form.

ARGUMENT
{

POINT

I.
THE STATE MISAPPLIES RAMIREZ BY
CONDUCTING ONLY A SUPERFICIAL FACT COMPARISON
TO THE FACTS IN RAMIREZ, RATHER THAN A
SEARCHING EXAMINATION OF THE RELIABILITY OF
THE IDENTIFICATIONS UNDER THE LEGAL FACTORS
SET FORTH IN THE OPINION.

<

Without supporting authority, the State proceeds on the
untenable premise that analysis under Ramirez consists of nothing
more than a comparison of the facts at bar with those in Ramirez.

<

The State focuses on those factors where the facts in Ramirez were
more favorable to its position,1 but glosses over those factors
which cut more strongly in favor of Mr. Lopez.2

i

1

E.cr. , greater opportunity to view the perpetrators, and lack
of any mask.
2

E.cr. , that the descriptions do not match Mr. Lopez' physical
characteristics or the clothing he was wearing; the failure of any
of the eyewitnesses to notice facial hair on the perpetrator; the
cross-contamination of the identifications as the result of all
three being together and speaking with each other at the time of
identification; the inconsistent testimony as to the role played by
the perpetrator identified as Mr. Lopez from being a third
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(

i

Ramirez does not set forth a checklist, requiring that
each factor militate in favor of suppression.

Rather, any single

factor, if sufficiently egregious, may be sufficient to undermine
reliability and require suppression.

Ramirez, 817 P. 2d at 784

(indicating that, under the facts of that case, the suggestiveness
of the identification was most critical).

POINT II. DISCREPANCIES IN THE DESCRIPTIONS GIVEN
BY THE EYEWITNESSES ARE SIGNIFICANT AND
STRONGLY SUPPORT A FINDING OF UNRELIABILITY.
The State puts the cart before the horse in arguing that
"any discrepancies between the witnesses individual descriptions of
defendant's appearance and/or between defendant's appearance at the
time of his arrest, do not render the identifications inadmissible,
but do bear on the individual eyewitness's credibility and weight
the jurors may give the identification testimony."
19.

State's br. at

The State makes the same mistake concerning identification

here as that made by the trial court concerning the lawfulness of
the stop in Ramirez. The trial court serves a critical gatekeeping
function

in precluding

unreliable evidence.

the

admission

of

illegally

seized

and

Reliability is a threshold matter to be

determined in the first instance by the trial court.

The jury is

only entitled to hear and assess the weight of the identification

perpetrator, to the perpetrator who was behind Brandi, to the
perpetrator who confronted Rick and Donny; the coercive effect of
identification of the getaway car in leading the eyewitnesses to
expect that the perpetrators had been apprehended and were in the
showup; and the selective handcuffing that naturally made Mr. Lopez
and Mr. Gomez appear to be the guilty parties.
5
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evidence

if

it

is first determined

by the trial

sufficiently reliable to warrant admission.
descriptions

given

by

the

eyewitnesses

court

to be

Discrepancies in the

must

be

considered

in

conjunction with all the other factors in assessing reliability.
The discrepancies here were significant.
5'4", weighing 180 or 185 pounds.

Mr. Lopez was

R. 246:155, 230:189, Ex. 12.

The eyewitnesses described the perpetrator identified at trial as
Mr. Lopez as 5'5M

and 165 pounds

(Rick, Ex. 33), 5'5M

and 145

pounds (Brandi, Ex. 31), and similar to 5'7" and 150 pounds (Donny,
Ex. 32) .

Each eyewitness desciribes someone somewhat taller and

fairly significantly lighter than Mr. Lopez.
The State's reliance in its brief at p. 19 on State v.
Perry, 899 P. 2d 1232, 1234-5 (Utah App. 1995) is wholly misplaced.
In Perry, the witness described the perpetrator as 5'6" to 5'7" and
150

pounds.

Mr.

Perry

was

5'9"

tall

and

170

pounds.

The

discrepancy there indicates only that the victim underestimated the
perpetrator's size.

The description given describes a person with

a similar build to the person apprehended.

Perry would be apropos

here if the perpetrator had been described as 5'2" and 16 0 pounds,
or 5'6" and 205 pounds.

Here, Mr. Lopez is uniformly shorter and

heavier than the person described by the eyewitnesses.
described

someone

slightly

stocky, Mr.

Lopez

While they

in contrast

was

downright heavy if not obese.

See Ex. 11, 26.

The descriptions

simply do not match Mr. Lopez.

The identification is unreliable.

The State similarly minimizes the fact that the witnesses
were entirely inconsistent as to what part the perpetrator they
6
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identified as Mr. Lopez may have played in the robbery.
than being

Rather

"relatively insignificant," State's br. at 22, this

inconsistency

draws

into

question

the

memory

acquisition,

retention, and recall abilities of each of the witnesses.

Their

inability to keep their stories straight draws into question the
veracity and reliability of those stories.
Mr.

Lopez

agrees with

the

State

that

the

witnesses

consistently described the perpetrator's height and weight, but
this consistency does not Mlend[] weight to the accuracy of their
individual observations,"

State's br. at 24.

They consistently

describe someone taller and lighter, hence thinner, than Mr. Lopez.
They described the actual perpetrator, who was not Mr. Lopez.

POINT III. THE STATE IMPROPERLY IGNORES THE TAINT
OF THE IMPROPERLY SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP ON LATER
PROCEEDINGS.
The

State

improperly

characterizes

the

photo

spread

identifications as being independently obtained, State's br. at 21,
without taking into consideration the fact that the initial showup
was not

independent, but rather a tainted collaborative effort.

This taint carries over to all subsequent identifications, and
renders them equally unreliable.

POINT

IV.
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING ON THE
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE MAY NOT BE EQUATED
WITH A RULING THAT THE IDENTIFICATIONS WERE
SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE TO GO TO THE JURY.

The State correctly notes that the trial court ruled that
the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury, State's br. at 28,
7
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but this ruling may not be equated with a finding of reliability.
A ruling on sufficiency necessarily assumes that the evidence
presented was properly admissible.

The trial court's finding of

sufficiency assumes, without deciding, the reliability of the
identifications.

As

a

result

of

trial

counsel's

deficient

performance, the trial court never had occasion to address that
issue.
Mr. Lopez relies on his opening brief in response to
those portions of the State's brief not expressly addressed here.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Lopez respectfully requests
that his conviction be reversed, and that the case be remanded for
^Ji^

further proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

r

P

day of April, 1999.

l//d?

v VK

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A
Statutes, Rules, and Constitutional Provisions
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The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Criminal actions - Provisions concerning - Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district wherein the crime shall have
been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of counsel for his defence.

The

fourteenth

amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution provides:
Section 1. [Citizenship -- Due process of law -- Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of laws.
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Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 7.

[Due process of law.]

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides:
Sec. 12.

[Rights of accused persons.]

In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right to appear and defend in person and by counsel,
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall
any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his
wife, nor shall any person, be twice put in jeopardy for
the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a
preliminary examination, the function of that examination
is limited to determining whether probable cause exists
unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this
constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable
cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
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